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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
END 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a partial summary 
judgment in a civil case entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah. 
The court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the lower court erred in granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of the respondents. 
Specifically whether there were genuine issues of fact 
as to: 
(a) Whether the legal descriptions of appellants 
property describe and include the property on which 
respondents have constructed their homes, driveways 
and other structures; and 
(b) Whether respondents have paid the property 
taxes assessed against the property in dispute for the 
seven years required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-12-12 (1987) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
STATUTE 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-12-12—POSSESSION MUST BE 
CONTINUOUS AND TAXES PAID. 
"In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisions of 
any section of this code, unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for a period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed on October 15, 1987 by 
appellant, Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. claiming that he owned 
certain property in Summit County, that respondent Pelton 
had constructed a home and driveway on appellant's property 
without appellant's approval, and that respondent Garlick 
had constructed a home and other structures on appellant's 
property without appellant's approval. Appellant sought an 
order of the court declaring respondents to be unlawfully 
detaining the premises, for an order restoring the property 
to the appellant, for an order declaring respondents to have 
trespassed on appellant's property and for an order declaring 
that appellant has right, title and interest to the property. 
On November 28, 1988 respondents Garlick and 
Pelton moved for partial summary judgment and on January 
20, 1989 Judge J. Dennis Frederick granted respondents' 
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motion. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider which 
was denied by Judge Frederick on February 7, 1989. Appellant 
filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (hereinafter 
"appellant") is owner of real property located in Sections 
28 and 29, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Summit County, 
Utah. (See property description, Trial Court Record, page 
279 (hereinafter R). In 1972 Veigh Cummings and Jo Ellen 
Cummings, as grantors, gave to W. Allan Pelton and JoAnn 
Pelton as grantees, a warranty deed which purports to convey 
a portion of the property in question. (See property 
description, R. 184). 
On August 1, 1978 Peter Swaner, as grantor 
gave to Ennis J. Gibbs and Barbara Allen Parish Gibbs a 
warranty deed that purports to convey property to them which 
in March 1987 was given to Jeffrey K. Garlick and Janet E. 
Garlick, a warranty deed that purports to convey the 
remainder of the property in question. (See property 
description, R. 167). 
In July and August of 1987 a licensed surveyor 
James West conducted a survey of the property described. 
Upon completion of the survey, James West, who has been 
qualified as an expert witness in the district courts in the 
state of Utah submitted his expert opinion. (See James 
-3-
West's Affidavits, (R. 278-282 and R. 289-293). James 
West concluded that "the houses and improvements owned by 
Jeffery K. and Janet E. Garlick and W. Allan and JoAnn 
Pelton are partially located within the metes and bounds 
description of appellant's property and portions of the 
Garlick home and improvements are located in Section 28, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian." 
(R. 280, paragraph 6)(R. 291, paragraph 4). 
Additionally he concluded that respondents 
Garlickfs home and improvements "are not located exclusive-
ly within Section 29, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian as reflected by the Summit County 
Tax plats, but are in fact partially located in Section 28 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
and are in fact located on the Gillmor property." (R. 280, 
paragraph 7) (R. 290, paragraph 4). 
Additionally, he "concluded that portions of 
the Gillmor property as described in the metes and bounds 
descriptions are not located exclusively in Section 28, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian as reflected by the Summit County tax plats but 
are in fact partially located in Section 29, Township 1 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
portions of the Pelton improvements are in fact located on 
the Gillmor property." (R. 280-281, paragraph 8) (R. 291, 
paragraph 4). 
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Finally, Mr. West concludes that the 
property described in the metes and bounds description of 
the tax assessment records of Summit County, as they relate 
to Serial No. SS-59-A (that being the Charles F. Gillmor, 
Jr. tax assessment as it relates to this property) is the 
same property described in the land survey he conducted and 
that the legal descriptions of the tax notices and the land 
survey describe and include the same property. (R. 292, 
paragraph 5). 
The respondents moved for partial summary 
judgment on November 29, 1988. (R. 145-47). Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick entered a minute entry ruling granting 
respondent's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 
254) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
James G. West, a licensed surveyor conducted 
a survey of appellant's land which is the subject of this law 
suit. In conducting the survey he used the metes and bounds 
description of the warranty deed dated October 25, 1926 and 
as a result of that survey he concluded that respondents 
have constructed their homes, driveways and other structures 
on appellant's property. In addition to the land survey, 
Mr. West reviewed the metes and bounds description set forth 
in copies of the tax assessment records of Summit County as 
they relate to the property in question and after such 
comparison he concluded that the property described in said 
tax assessment records describes the same piece of 
property as that of his land survey wherein he determined 
that respondents had constructed houses, driveways and other 
structures on appellant's property. 
Having established that the appellant's 
property includes the property on which the respondents 
have constructed their homes, driveways and other structures, 
the question of who paid the taxes assessed for that property 
remains. A genuine issue of fact exists as to whether 
respondents paid taxes for the requisite period of time as 
required in Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-12 (1987) to 
establish acquisition of property by adverse possession. 
There are genuine issues of material fact 
in the present case and the appellant is entitled to a trial 
on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS AS THERE IS 
A DISPUTE AS TO A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT. 
A. The legal descriptions of appellant's property 
and tax assessment notices describe and include 
the property on which respondents have 
constructed their homes, driveways and other 
structures. 
The trial court granted partial summary 
judgment to the respondents, the Garlicks and the Peltons. 
"Summary Judgment should be granted under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 56(c) 'only when it is clear from the 
undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail.1" 
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Bergen v. Traveler Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 
802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The standard of review to be applied to an 
appeal from summary judgment was set forth in Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
fi[W]e consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party and 
affirm only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of 
fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Id. at 528-29. 
"If...we conclude that there is a dispute as to a genuine 
issue of material fact, we must reverse the grant of 
summary judgment and remand for trial on that issue" 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'1 Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 
1987). 
"Appellate courts scrutinize summary 
judgment under the same standard applied by 
the trial courts, according no particular 
deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions concerning whether the material 
facts are in dispute and if not, what legal 
result obtains." Wycalis v. Guardian Title 
of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the appellant, it is clear that there is 
a genuine dispute as to the material issue of fact, namely 
whether respondents have constructed homes, structures and 
other improvements on the property of appellant. 
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This lawsuit concerns real property in 
Summit County, Utah. Various legal descriptions were 
presented to the trial court. These descriptions on 
their face seem to describe separate and distinct pieces of 
property. (See property descriptions, R. 167, 184, 220, 
224, 225, 226, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 279). However 
it is fundamental that the same property may be described 
in more than one way and by more than one legal description. 
James G. West, a licensed surveyor in the 
state of Utah conducted a survey of the appellant's property. 
The purpose of the survey was to establish the boundaries of 
the appellant's parcel of land. James West has been 
qualified as an expert witness in the district courts in the 
State of Utah and following the completion of the survey 
James West submitted his expert opinion in his affidavit. 
(R. 278-282). See also (R. 289-293). He concluded that 
the appellant's property description includes the property 
on which the respondents have constructed their homes, 
driveways and other structures. 
The trial court could have arrived at the same 
conclusion as James West's survey by simply platting the 
various legal descriptions on a map of Summit County. While 
it is unclear from the record why the trial court granted 
the motion for partial summary judgment it appears that such 
decision was based on the fact that different legal 
descriptions were used and therefore the court concluded 
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different pieces of property were described and therefore 
there was no genuine issue of material fact. 
However, a careful study and platting of the 
various legal descriptions establishes facts contrary to the 
court's decision. James West surveyed the property based on 
the legal descriptions set forth in the tax notices 
(R. 220, 226, 272 through 277), and in the original deed 
concerning said property (R. 279, 282) and demonstrated 
that although there are different legal descriptions, they 
do not describe separate pieces of property but in fact 
describe the same piece of property. 
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the appellant, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the property on which respondents 
have constructed their homes, driveways and other structures 
is within the legal description of appellant's parcel of 
land and therefore situated on his property. The expert 
opinion of James West concludes that the appellant holds the 
legal title to the property and that respondents have 
constructed their homes, driveways and other structures on 
appellant's property, (R. 280, paragraph 6 & 7) (R. 290 
paragraph 4) but Judge J. Dennis Frederick, by granting 
partial summary judgment, concluded that there is "no 
genuine issue as to the material fact." From the 
foregoing evidence, the trial court erred in granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of the respondents. 
-9-
B. Respondents have not paid the property 
taxes assessed against the property in dispute 
for the seven years required by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-12 (1987). 
Assuming the appellant is the record owner 
of the property in dispute, the respondents would have to 
establish title to the property by virtue of the doctrine 
of adverse possession. "One who seeks to acquire title to 
real property must comply precisely with the statutory 
requirements for doing so." United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Estate of Clegg, 737 P.2d 173, 176 (Utah 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
The conditions required to establish title 
by adverse possession are set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-12 (1987) which provides: 
"In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisions of 
any section of this code, unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law." 
The Utah Supreme Court summarized Section 78-12-12 as 
follows: 
"This section provides that to obtain title by 
adverse possession, the claimant must be in 
actual, open, notorious, and exclusive 
possession of the property for seven years 
continuously during which time the claimant or 
his predecessors, must pay all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law." Royal Street Land Co. v. 
Reed, 739, P.2d 1104, 1006 (Utah 198/) . 
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The respondents would be required to show that, 
they paid taxes assessed on the property for seven years in 
order to obtain title by adverse possession. If the property 
taxes were paid by the respondents, they would have to prove 
that they paid them before the appellant. The law is clear 
in Utah that in order to show adverse possession, one must 
prove that he paid the taxes on the property adversely 
claimed and that he did so prior in time to payment of the 
record holder and for seven consecutive years. Parsons v. 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah 1984) (citing Neely v. 
Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979); Homeowner's Loan 
Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943). There is a 
question of fact as to whether the respondents paid the 
taxes assessed on the property before the appellant paid them 
and whether they did so for seven consecutive years. If the 
respondents did not, then they have not obtained title to 
the property through adverse possession. 
In Christensen v. Munster, 266 P.2d 756 (Utah 
1954) the Utah Supreme Court held that payment by the record 
title holder of taxes prior to payment by the adverse pos-
sessor interrupts the running of the seven years prescribed 
period necessary to acquire title by adverse possession. The 
court stated: 
"...we hold that payment by the record owner 
or his agent of the taxes for one or more 
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years during the seven year period, prior to 
any payment thereof having been made by the 
adverse possessor not only extinguishes his 
tax liability, but extinguishes the tax itself 
-effectively interrupts the continuity of 
events necessary to perfect title by adverse 
possession." Id. at 757. 
By virtue of the affidavits of respondents, 
W. Allan Pelton (R. 179-204) and Jeffrey Garlick (R. 163-
169) and the affidavit of the appellant Charles F. Gillmor, 
Jr. (R. 221-226) (R. 260-277), clearly there is a question of 
fact as to whether the respondents have established that they 
paid the property taxes in question, prior in time to the 
appellant and for seven consecutive years. 
The affidavit of Pelton purports to show 
seven, years of payment of taxes. (R. 181, paragraph 5). 
However, a comparison of the dates of payment set forth in 
said affidavit with the dates of payments for said taxes 
set forth in the affidavit of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr. 
(R. 222, paragraph 7) establishes that for the year 1987 
Pelton1s purported payment occurred on November 24, 1987 
when in fact plaintiff had already paid the taxes on November 
4, 1987, that for the year 1986 Pelton1s purported payment 
occurred on December 1, 1986 when in fact plaintiff had 
already paid the taxes on November 14, 1986. 
The affidavits of Gibbs and Garlick purport 
to show seven years of payment of taxes. (See R. 171-72, 
paragraph 6 and R. 165, paragraph 4). However, a 
comparison of the dates of payments set forth in said 
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affidavit with the dates of payment for said taxes set forth 
in the affidavit of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr. paragraph 
seven establishes that for the year 1987 Garlick purported-
ly paid on November 17, 1987 when in fact plaintiff had 
already paid on November 7, 1987. That for the year 1986 
Gibbs had purportedly paid on December 1, 1986 when in 
fact the plaintiff had already paid on November 14, 1986. 
Again viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the appellant, clearly the lower court 
erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the 
respondents. The doctrine of adverse possession requires 
that the respondents prove that they have complied precisely 
with the terms of the statute. There is a question of 
genuine fact as to whether respondents did "comply precisely" 
with the statute, namely whether they paid the taxes. 
Therefore, partial summary judgment was inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. requests 
that this court remand the case for a trial on the 
merits. There are genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute as to whether the appellant is the record title 
holder of the property in dispute and whether the respondents 
established their right to title by adverse possession. 
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DATED this <r° day of January, 1990. 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Lawyer for Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the 
above and foregoing to Bruce A. Maak and Michael Later, 
attorneys for respondents Garlick, Pelton and Valley 
Bank, 185 South state Street, Suite 1300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111; Lowell Suminerhays, attorney for respondent 
Timberlake, 4609 South State Street, P. 0. Box 1355, Murray, 
Utah 84107 and Dennis M. Astill, attorney for respondent 
Valley Bank, 6th Floor, Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this T' daY o f January, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-12—Possession must be 
continuous and taxes paid: 
In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisions 
of any section of this code, unless it shall 
be shown that the land has been occupied 
and claimed for a period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors, and grantors have paid all 
taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law. 
D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
Lawyer for CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7074 
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PETER SWANER, W. ALLAN 
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COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. 
WEST 
Civil No. 9568 
Judge Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JAMES G. WEST being first duly sworn, upon 
his oath deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a licensed surveyor (#3082-
Utah) in the state of Utah having been licensed since 1967, 
273 
2. That affiant has 34 years experience as 
a land surveyor and has been qualified as an expert witness 
in the District Courts in the state of Utah. 
3. In July and August of 1987, affiant, at 
the request of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr. conducted a survey 
of the following described piece of property: 
Beginning East along the section line 
1023.00 feet and North 1732.50 feet from 
the Southwest Corner of Section 28, Township 1 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian, thence North 351.36 feet; thence 
East 4257.00 feet to the East line of said 
Section 28; thence North along the section 
line 3196.14 feet, more or less, to the 
Northeast Corner of said Section 28, then 
West along the section line to the North 
Quarter Corner of said Section 28; thence 
South along the quarter section line 1320.00 
feet more or less, to the Southwest corner of 
the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
quarter of said Section 28; thence West 
2640.00 feet, more or less, to a point on the 
west line of said Section 28; that is South 
1320.00 feet, more or less, from the Northwest 
Corner of said Section 28, thence South 330.00 
feet, thence West 198.00 feet; thence 
Southeasterly 1006.50 feet, more or less, to 
the West Quarter Corner of said Section 28; 
thence East 49.50 feet, thence southeasterly 
along a road to a point that is 82.50 feet 
West of the point of beginning. 
Contains 314.17 acres, more or less. 
4. The purpose of said survey was to 
establish the boundary lines of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr.'s 
parcel of land. 
-2-
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5. Upon completion of said survey, your 
affiant prepared Exhibit A which is attached hereto. 
6. As a result of said survey, your affiant 
herewith concludes that the houses and improvements owned by 
Jeffrey K. and Janet E. Garlick and W. Allan and JoAnn Pelton 
are partially located within the metes and bounds description 
of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr.fs property and portions of the 
Garlick home and improvements are located in Section 28, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
7. As a result of said survey, your affiant 
concluded that the above referred to Garlick home and 
improvements are not located exclusively within Section 29, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
as reflected by the Summit County tax plats, but are in 
fact partially located in Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and are in fact located 
on the Gillmor property. 
8. As a result of said survey, your affiant 
concludes that portions of the Gillmor property as described 
in the metes and bounds descriptions are not located 
exclusively in Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian as reflected by the Summit County 
tax plats but are in fact partially located in Section 29, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
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and portions of the Pelton improvements are in fact located 
on the Gillmor property. 
e?Y 
SUBSCRIBED AN 
day of J anua ry , 19f8 
My Commission Expires: 
N to before me this 
'^Lc^^g^-/^^ 
PUBLIC 
at Salf-Cake City, Utah 
-7—y 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing to Michael M. Later, KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & 
WADDOUPS, 185 South State Street, Suite 1300, P. 0. Box 
11019, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 and Lowell Summerhays, 
attorney for Cummings and Timber Lakes Corporation, 4609 
South State Street, P. 0. Box 1355, Murray, Utah 84107 
this *£>/ day of January, 1989^  
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NO. 
FILED" 
D. GILBERT ATHAY (0143) 
Lawyer for CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 3 63-7074 
fir. 
L c-
Deputy Cer 
'• bounty 
,' * ,* **i*lll<— 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VEIGH CUMMINGS, JEFFREY K. 
GARLICK, JANET E. GARLICK, 
PETER SWANER, W. ALLAN 
PELTON, TIMBER LAKES 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpor-
ation, VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE 
W. ALLAN PELTON TRUST and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 48, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. 
WEST 
Civil No. 9568 
Judge Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JAMES G. WEST being first duly sworn, upon 
his oath deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is the same James West who signed 
the affidavit dated January 24, 1989. 
O Q C 
2. That on February 8, 1989 he reviewed the 
metes and bounds description of the warranty deed dated 
October 25, 1926 wherein Charles R. Spencer and Isabell 
Spencer granted to Stephen Gillmor certain property. 
The property description set forth in that warranty deed 
is as follows: 
The East one-half, Southeast one-quarter 
of Northwest one-quarter, and the Northeast 
one-quarter of Southwest one-quarter of 
Section 28f Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, containing 400 acres more 
or less, ALSO 
Beginning at a point 100 rods South and 12 
rods West from the Northwest corner of said 
Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, at a point on the East 
side of a public road 6 rods wide and 3 rods 
Easterly at right angles from the center line 
of said road; and running thence East 12 rods 
thence North 20 rods; thence East 80 rods; 
thence South 240 rods to the South line of 
said Section; thence West 18 rods; thence 
North 105 rods; thence West approximately 5 
rods to a point on the Easterly side of the 
aforesaid 6 rod wide road and at a point 3 
rods Easterly from the center line of said 
road and at right angles thereto; thence along 
the Easterly side of said road and 3 rods 
Easterly from the center line thereof and at 
right angles thereto, Northerly and Westerly 
to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest one-quarter of Section 
28, aforesaid; thence West 3 rods; thence 
Northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods more or 
less, to the point of beginning and containing 
78.25 acres more or less. 
3. That subsequent to reviewing the metes and 
bounds description set forth above, affiant compared said 
description with the original deed description from which he 
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prepared the land survey of August 1987 which was attached 
to affiant's previous affidavit of January 24, 1989 as an 
Exhibit. The warranty deed of October 25, 1926 and the 
description he used to prepare said survey describe the 
same piece of property. 
4. That had affiant conducted his land 
survey using only the metes and bounds description set forth 
in the warranty deed of October 25, 1926 affiant would still 
concluded that (a) the houses and improvements owned by 
Jeffrey and Janet E. Garlick and W. Allan Pelton and 
JoAnn Pelton are partially located within the metes and 
bounds description of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr.fs property 
and portions of the Garlick home and improvements are 
located within Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian and (b) the above referred to Garlick 
home and improvements are not located exclusively within 
Section 29, township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian as reflected by the Summit County tax plats, but 
are in fact partially located in Section 28, Township 1 South 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and are in fact 
located on the Gillmor property and (c) that portions of 
the Gillmor property as described in the metes and bounds 
descriptions are not located exclusively in Section 28, 
Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
as reflected by the Summit County tax plats but are in fact 
partially located in Section 29, Township 1 South, Range 4 
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East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and portions of the Pelton 
improvements are in fact located on the Gillmor property. 
5. That on February 8, 1989 your affiant 
reviewed the metes and bounds description set forth in copies 
of the tax assessment records of Summit County as they 
relate to property serial number SS-59-A (that being the 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. tax assessment as it relates to this 
property) and that he has compared said metes and bounds 
description with that which your affiant used to prepare the 
land survey of August 1987 attached to affiant's previous 
affidavit of January 24, 1989 and as a result of said 
comparison, your affiant concludes that both descriptions 
are describing the same piece of property. 
4 I^OJU^C 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
<7—- day of February, 1 
ResidirKjsat Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing to Michael M. Later, KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & 
WADDOUPS, 185 South State Street, Suite 1300, P. 0. Box 
11019, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 and Lowell Summerhays, 
attorney for Cummings and Timber Lakes Corporation, 4609 
South State Street, P. 0. Box 1355, Murray, Utah 84107 
this ( day of February, 1982.. 
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